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ABSTRACT 
Human beings have the capacity to represent, conceptualize and reason about mind and 
behaviour. This is due to the advance of folk theory of mind (ToM) in them. We use mental 
constructs not only to understand actions, but to envisage behaviour of others. Our ToM 
allows us to find the way of our personal and social world by explaining past behaviour 
and anticipating and predicting future actions. However young children have an 
elementary ToM which develops into adult like ToM within a few years. Researches show 
that children’s attribution of behaviour is influenced by some social environmental factors 
which influence the rate of typical development ToM. A special focus of this study is how 
children’s attribution of behavior is shaped by their family environment. Children of about 
3 to 5 years olds have participated in the study. This research includes the observation and 
recording of mother- child interaction, adult-adult interaction, and situational probing for 
both child as well as other adults. The results favored the advantage of age in the use of 
mental state terms by higher age groups.  
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CHAPTER-I 
Introduction 
Human beings are social beings. So they are always interested in knowing about others. 
We, the human beings are always interested to know about others, and then we know 
that how to interact with them. In the process of knowing each other we come across 
explaining our own and other’s behaviour. This is also known as attribution. Different 
people give different attributions for behaviour. Attribution means explanation. It’s a 
concept in psychology whereby people attribute traits and causes to the things they 
observe. 
     Attributions are of several kinds, such as normative, where people attribute towards a 
norm, situational, where people tends to attribute to a situation, and it may be a trait 
attribution, where people tend to attribute to their trait for a behaviour (Malle, 2004). 
That is in a sense we always try to know the intentionality of other people to accomplish 
our goals. Intentionality can be defined as any act done or made or performed with 
purpose and intent. Intentionality is assumed every time we describe someone including 
ourselves as thinking that so and so is the case, or wishing that such and such would 
happen (Dennet, 1987). 
     In that sense we all are psychologists. This is called folk theory of psychology (Stitch 
& Nicholes, 2003). It is also known as the theory of mind (ToM). Folk theory of 
psychology can be defined as the knowledge each person possess that helps them to 
interprete things like personal emotions, desires, and also allows them to interprete the 
emotions, desires and possible behaviour of other people. In this view every one is a folk 
or naïve, psychologist. That is constantly reading or interpreting their feelings trying to 
figure out what anyone else is feeling or planning to do. According to this view every 
one possesses the ability to do this, though there can be variations in a person’s ability to 
understand self and others. Understanding false belief refers to understanding theory of 
mind. False belief can be defined as a misconception resulting from incorrect reasoning. 
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False belief task is the most important milestone in ToM development, in gaining the 
ability to attribute false belief. That is to recognise that others can have belief about the 
world that is diverging.  
     To do this, one must understand that how knowledge is formed i.e. people’s belief are 
based on their knowledge that mental states that is feelings, thinking, desires, threats can 
differ from reality and that people’s behaviour  can be predicted by their mental states. 
The most common version of false belief task is called as Sally-Anne task, which was 
developed by Wimmer and Perner in 1983. It has been seen that the most important 
development of ToM takes place in the early childhood. However most normally 
developing children experience some of the difficulties in developing ToM in the age of 
4-5 years. Researchers have been shown that family plays an important role in 
developing ToM among children. It is very much relevant to study the explanation of 
behaviour of children among 3 to 5 years, so that appropriate steps can be taken to 
modify the behaviour. 
1.1 Theory of mind 
Theory of mind was first coined by Premack and Woodruff in 1978. According to them 
theory of mind is that “allows us to understand that what we believe to be true and what 
is true may be different”.  
     We utilize thinking of invisible, intangible, and yet reasonably very useful entities 
such as intentions, desires, beliefs, and knowledge to make human and animal behavior 
comprehensible and predictable. So automatic are these processes of inferences and 
attributions that it is not until something goes wrong that their unexpected characteristics 
become salient and present themselves to our awareness. The growing thought of a 
series of Theory of Mind Mechanisms, or ToMM, however, is also of great interest for 
the understanding of normal human psychology.  A developed theory of mind requires a 
representational system. This permits the representational mapping of others' emotional 
states in a manner that is different from picking up their emotions directly. For instance, 
an intention can be mapped onto a representational emotional topology, going from "the 
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fox is chasing the chicken" (goal-directed) through "the fox is trying to catch the 
chicken" (intentionality) through "the fox wants to eat the chicken" (motivational) to 
"the fox is chasing the chicken and trying to catch it because it is hungry and wants to 
eat it" (emotional). Similarly for the chicken: it is running (goal directed) away from the 
fox (intentionality) because it is afraid (emotional) of being eaten (motivational).Such 
motivational and emotional attributions may lead the attribution of epistemic states to 
others, which is the hallmark of a Theory of Mind.  
     A theory of mind is a powerful means of making sense of the social world.  It enables 
explanations and prediction of the behaviour of agents, and communication.  
Palaeoarchaelogical evidence shows it was in place at least 40,000 years ago, and 
comparative data from studies of existing primates shows that aspects of a theory of 
mind may be as old as 6 million years.  Specifically, recognizing volitional states and a 
sensitivity to eye-direction may be a skill we share with the apes, and therefore with our 
common ancestor 6 million years ago.  In contrast, shared attention and recognizing 
epistemic states may be unique to Homo sapiens. The phrase Theory of Mind was 
introduced by Premack and Woodruff (1978a), who, writing about chimpanzees, defined 
it as the ability to impute mental states to oneself and others.  
    Theory of Mind (ToM) is the branch of cognitive science that investigates how we 
ascribe mental states to other persons and how we use the states to explain and predict 
the actions of those other persons (Baron & Cohen, 2001). More accurately, it is the 
branch that investigates mindreading or mentalizing or mentalistic abilities. These skills 
are shared by almost all human beings beyond early childhood. They are used to treat 
other agents as the bearers of unobservable psychological states and processes, and to 
anticipate and explain the agents’ behavior in terms of such states and processes. These 
mentalistic abilities are also called “folk psychology” by philosophers, and “naïve 
psychology” and “intuitive psychology” by cognitive scientists. 
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                1.2   FALSE BELIEF TASK 
      One of the most important milestones in theory of mind development is gaining the 
ability to attribute 
      The most common version of the false-belief task is called as Sally- Anne task. In 
this task, children are told or shown a story involving two characters. For example, a 
child is shown two dolls named as Sally and Anne, who have a basket and a box, 
respectively. Sally also has a marble, which she places in her basket, and then leaves to 
take a walk. While she is out of the room, Anne takes the marble from the basket, finally 
putting it in the box. Sally returns, and the child is then asked where Sally will look for 
the marble. The child passes the task if she answers that Sally will look in the basket, 
where she put the marble; the child fails the task if she answers that Sally will look in 
the box, where the child knows the marble is hidden, even though Sally cannot know, 
since she did not see it hidden there. In order to pass the task, the child must be able to 
understand that another’s mental representation of the situation is different from their 
own, and the child must be able to predict behavior based on that understanding. The 
results of research using false-belief tasks have been fairly consistent: most normally-
developing children are unable to pass the tasks until about age four.  
false belief: that is, to recognize that others can have beliefs about the 
world that are diverging. To do this, it is recommended that one must understand how 
knowledge is formed, that people’s beliefs are based on their knowledge, that mental 
states can differ from reality, and that people’s behavior can be predicted by their mental 
states. Wimmer and Perner has developed false belief task in 1983. Various versions of 
false belief task have been identified till now. 
     Other version of false-belief task is appearance- reality task. It has been developed to 
try to solve the problems inbuilt in the false-belief task. In the "appearance-reality", or 
"Smarties" task, the children are asked that what they believe to be the contents of a box 
that looks as though it holds a candy called "smarties". After the child guesses 
"Smarties," each is shown that the box in fact contained pencils. The experimenter then 
re-closes the box and asks the child what she or he thinks another person, who has not 
been shown the true contents of the box, will think is inside. The child passes the task if 
5 
 
she responds that another person will think that there are "Smarties" in the box, but fails 
the task if she responds that another person will think that the box contains pencils. It 
has been found that children pass the task at the age of four to five years. 
1.3   MODES OF EXPLANATION 
     According to Malle (1989) four modes of explanations are given by human beings in 
their day to day life. These explanations are either intentional or unintentional. If the 
explainer does not see the behaviour as intentional then it is called as “cause 
explanation”. And if the explainer sees the behaviour as intentional, and it only explains 
the action then it called as “enabling factor explanation”. And if the explanation contains 
action and intention and do not contain the content of his or her mind when he/ she 
formed the intention, then it is called as “causal history explanation”. And that if the 
agent having the content of the explanation on his or her mind when he/ she formed 
intention is called as “reason explanation”. 
1.3.1   CAUSE EXPLANATION 
     If the explained behaviour is unintentional, the explanation is a cause explanation. 
Such explanation mentions the factors that caused the unintentional behaviour. 
For example: Dolly is yawning during the lecture because she hadn’t gotten enough 
sleep. 
     Whether the behaviour is unintentional or not must be decided from the perspective 
of the explainer. 
     Cause explanations are mechanical explanations, following straight forward physical 
or psychological regularities (e.g., stimuli cause sensations, other people cause 
emotions, traits influence behaviour). A mechanical cause brings about the behaviour 
without intervention of the agent’s intention or will and sometimes against the agent’s 
will. 
     Cause explanation never indicate the purpose of a behaviuor; in fact cause 
explanations imply that the behaviour had no particular purpose- it happened 
unintentionally, brought about by certain causes. 
6 
 
     In the case of cause explanation, the actor need not be aware of the cause relation 
between the cause and the behaviour. 
     In general the actor need not even be aware of the explained behaviour itself (Malle, 
1989) 
1.3.2   REASON EXPLANATION 
     Reason explanations explain intentional actions by citing the kinds of things the 
agent considered when forming an intention to act — the reasons for which. the agent 
performed the action. These reasons are subjective mental states (desires, beliefs, 
valuing) that the agent had at the time of deciding to act. For example, “Anne ignored 
Greg’s arguments because she knew she was right” or “Why did Jarron give in?” — “He 
wanted to end the argument.” 
 
     The presence of an intention can be confirmed by testing the meaningfulness of a 
reformulation of the explained behavior in the following format: “. . . [explanation], and 
that was her reason for choosing to [behavior] . . .” For example, “Anne ignored Greg's 
argument because she knew she was right,” would be reformulated as “She knew she 
was right, and that was her reason for choosing to ignore his argument.” Such a 
reformulation need not sound graceful, but it must sound acceptable. “She had a 
stomach ache because she ate too many cherries” is not a reason explanation because the 
reformulation, “She ate too many cherries and that was her reason for choosing to have a 
stomach ache” makes little sense. 
 
     Because the actor behaves for the reason given, he or she must be (at least dimly) 
aware of those reasons at the time of acting. If “Anne applauded the musicians” is 
explained by “because other people did so,” then Anne must have been aware that she 
applauded for that reason. If she didn’t, then other people’s applauding caused her to 
applaud (she did it “automatically”), which would suggest a code for a cause 
explanation.  
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     The agent must have regarded the cited reasons as suitable or reasonable grounds for 
acting  For example, “Ben interrupted his mother because he was thinking about other 
things” is not a reason explanation because his thinking about other things does not seem 
to provide reasonable grounds for interrupting her. However, “Ben interrupted his 
mother because he was thinking about leaving and wanted to let her know” is a reason 
explanation because Ben supposed the cited information as reasonable basis for acting ( 
Malle, 1989). 
 
1.3.3   CAUSAL HISTORIES OF REASON 
 
     Causal history of reason explanations also explain intentional behavior, but they cite 
factors that preceded (and caused) the agent’s reasons. These factors literally lie in the 
causal history of the actor’s reasons but are not themselves reasons. For example, “Why 
did Jarron give in?” — “He is good natured.” Here, Jarron wasn’t actually thinking, “I 
am good-natured; therefore, I should give in.” In fact, he may not even be aware that he 
is good-natured. Rather, the explainer presents Jarron’s good natured character as an 
objective fact that brought about his specific reasons (e.g., his desire to end the 
argument). 
 
     In contradiction of reasons, causal history factors are not considered by agents when 
forming an intention to act. Agents may not be aware of the causal history of their 
reasons, at least at the time they form their intention. Thus, when coders encounter an 
intentional behavior and need to decide whether it is explained by a causal history or a 
reason explanation, they should follow this rule: An explanatory content of which the 
agent was not aware cannot be the reason for which she acted; it is likely a causal 
history of her reasons. 
 
     If the explanation contains a factor of which the agent was aware, then it likely 
functioned as a reason: “Anne applauded the musicians. Why? Because she enjoyed 
their performance and she wanted to show that.” However, sometimes agents are 
normally aware of causal history factors, even if they did not keenly consider them when 
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they formed their intention. For example, “Anne invited Ben for lunch. Why? Because 
they are good friends.” Anne is generally aware of the fact that she and Ben are good 
friends. But when deciding to invite him for lunch, she probably did not think, “We are 
good friends; therefore I should invite him to lunch” (Malle, 1989). 
 
1.3.4   ENABLING FACTOR EXPLANATIONS 
 
     Enabling factor explanations cite factors that make clear how it was possible that an 
agent completed an intended action. Enabling factor explanations take it for decided that 
the agent had an intention to act as well as reasons to form that intention. They do not 
explain why the intention and reasons came about (as reason explanations or CHRs do) 
but rather cite factors that enabled the agent to turn the intention into a successful action. 
For example, if asked “How come Phoebe got all her work done?” one might say, 
“Because she had a lot of coffee.” Phoebe’s act of drinking coffee does not explain why 
she was trying to get her work done. Rather, given that she was trying to get it done, the 
coffee enabled her to succeed. 
 
      This mode of explanation does not really answer “Why?” questions, as all the other 
modes do, but rather “How was this possible?” questions. For example, “Jarron finished 
the assignment because he worked all night.” That he worked all night is not his reason 
for finishing, nor did it bring about his reason for finishing; rather, it explains how it was 
possible that he finished his assignment (given that he intended to do so). 
 
      Enabling factors include the agent's skill, opportunities, and other facilitating forces. 
 
     Enabling factor explanations only explain the action's occurrence — they cannot be 
used to explain why the agent formed the intention in the first place. (This is what 
reason explanations do.) 
     Knowing about the distinct modes of behavior explanation, we can go below the 
linguistic surface of explanations to understand the social perceiver’s conceptual 
assumptions that underlie the expressed explanations. For example, a reason explanation 
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such as “She isn’t coming to the party because her ex will be there” is traditionally 
classified as a situation cause even though her ex’s being at the party is surely not 
causing her decision to stay away. Rather, it is the agent’s subjective belief that her ex 
will be there that gives her a rational reason to stay away (Malle, 1989).                                                                        
 
                     1.4      RATIONALE OF THE STUDY 
 1.4.1   BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY  
      Behaviour can be defined as the act in which the individual acts or behaves. It is the 
way the individual conducts himself or herself. Behaviour should be viewed in reference 
to a phenomenon, object or a person. It can be seen in reference to the society norms, or 
the way in which one treats other or handles objects. 
         Behaviour is therefore the way the individual acts towards the people, society or 
objects. It can be either bad or good. It can be normal or abnormal according to society 
norms. Every individual has some behavioural differences. These differences are due to 
the following reasons. 
i. Individual differences 
ii. Differences in family patterns 
iii. Impairments and disabilities 
iv. Environmental factors 
v. Psychological factors 
      Attribution tells about how people explain things or behaviour. The synonym of 
attribution is ‘explanation’. We, the human beings explain about “why things happen” in 
two types. First we make an external explanation and the other is internal explanation.  
The external explanation indicates causality to an outside agent or force. On the contrary 
the internal explanations indicate causality within the person. An internal explanation 
says that the individual is directly responsible for the event whereas the external 
explanation says that some outside thing or force tends to do that event. Why attribution 
is important? If we can control the attributions people make, then we can influence their 
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future behaviour (Attribution theory).  When people make an internal attribution, it 
shows that they also change their attitudes and beliefs about themselves. The key for 
change is an internal attribution. But there appears some problem when people use 
external attributions. Let see the following example: 
     If children are asked for their behaviour (“why  is this class room so neat and 
clean?”) and they produce an external attribution and thus bringing the external 
attribution (“because the teacher is watching”), what kind of behaviour would we 
expect? As well as the teacher is watching, then the kids will be neat, but as soon as the 
teacher turns his back…, a big mess. The kids believe that their behaviour is under the 
control of an external force and not from their selves. This illustrates the problems that 
can arise when people use external things (like rewards and behaviours) to influence 
others.  
     However, external forces can be effective if the receiver believes that they earned the 
external factor for internal reasons. Thus rewards work well when the receiver thinks, I 
got the gold sticker because I am a good student who did a good job in the assignment. 
Or, punishments work well when the child thinks, I got punished because I did a bad 
thing. If children believe that they essentially did nothing on their own to earn external 
agent is unlikely to cause any long term internal change. 
     In essence, attribution theory shows us that people can create new attitudes, beliefs, 
or behaviours, depending on the explanations they make.  
     It has been hypothesized that actors tend to attribute behaviour to the situation where 
as observers tend attribute behaviour to the persons (Jones & Nisbette 1972).  That is 
observers tend to attribute a person’s behaviour to factors that lie within that person and 
actors tend to attribute behaviour to factors that lie in the external situation. Jones and 
Nisbette distinguished ‘situation attribution’ from another type of attribution in which 
behaviour is explained in terms of factors that lie within the agent who actually 
performed the behaviour. This other type of attribution is called “person attribution” 
which has been referred to as a “dispositional attribution”. Dispositional attribution 
11 
 
might be used to refer any factor that lies within the person including emotions, traits 
beliefs, sensations, and so forth (Heider, 1958). According to Rob Vanderbeeken and 
Erik Weber’s report on “dispositional attribution of behaviour”, if dispositions are 
envisaged as properties of systems that refer to possible causal relations, dispositions 
can be used in singular causal explanations. By means of these dispositional 
explanations, we can explain behavior B of a system x by  
(i) referring to a situation of type S that triggered B, given that x has a disposition D to 
do B in S, or  
(ii) By referring to a disposition D of x to do B in S, given that x is in a situation of type 
S.  
     Dispositional explanations are adequate and obligatory explanations. They can 
explain behavior B without unequivocally referring to the underlying causal basis in x 
that constitutes a disposition to do B. Radical Behaviorist explanations are a sort of 
dispositional explanations, but the dispositional model is not restricted to these 
explanations. The dispositional model is compatible with, or can be applied to, several 
research programs.  
     Individuals who can attribute mental states (e.g., beliefs) to other persons are said to 
possess a theory of mind (ToM). This ability allows us to interpret the behaviors of 
others in everyday social interactions. Before the age of 4 or 5 years, most normally 
developing children experience difficulty with some aspects of theory of mind, such as 
the ability to recognize that others may hold beliefs that are not true (“false belief”), or 
that objects may not always appear to the senses as they actually are (the “appearance-
reality” distinction). False belief and appearance-reality tasks, which assess ToM ability, 
are widely used as indicators of cognitive and social development. 
      To be successful on false belief tasks, children need to understand that individuals 
act in accordance with their beliefs even when their beliefs are false. For example, I look 
on the kitchen table for my keys even though they are in fact elsewhere. My belief (that 
my keys are on the table) is false. My behavior (looking on the table) is driven by my 
false belief, not by reality (the keys are in my son’s pocket). To succeed on appearance-
reality tasks, children must realize that an object’s appearance might conflict with 
12 
 
reality. For example, a white object viewed through a blue colored filter will appear 
blue, even though it is actually white. 
      Researches have been conducted to investigate whether children’s difficulty with 
false belief and appearance-reality tasks stems from the complex information that these 
tasks integrate. Three studies have been reported in which 3-, 4-, and 5- year-olds 
performed false belief and appearance-reality tasks. Also tasks were completed that were 
similar to ToM tasks in terms of content, but in which the information was less complex. 
In addition, children completed tasks that have different content to ToM tasks, but which 
are similar to ToM tasks in their complexity. If complexity is an important factor in 
performance on ToM tasks, then it would be expected that tasks with similar content to 
ToM tasks but which are less complex should be mastered earlier. In addition it would 
be expected that the ability to perform false belief and appearance-reality tasks would 
improve over the early childhood years, and that this improvement would coincide with 
improvement on other tasks of similar complexity. The results were in line with these 
expectations. 
 
      As in previous studies, most 3 years-old performed poorly and most 5-year-olds 
performed well on false belief and appearance-reality tasks in the three studies. The 
performance of the 4-year-olds was more variable, probably because this is a transitional 
phase. On the contrary, children of all ages succeeded on the tasks with similar content 
to false belief and appearance-reality tasks, but which were less complex. Still children 
who performed well on false belief and appearance-reality tasks generally performed 
well on tasks that were similar in complexity, but different in terms of content. These 
associations remained even after controlling for the effects of age. The results add to our 
understanding of the prolonged development of theory of mind abilities during 
childhood. However the false belief task has been reported to abandon for two reasons 
(Bloom & German, 2000). First, passing the false belief task requires abilities other than 
theory of mind. Second, theory of mind need not entail the ability to reason about false 
beliefs. An alternative conception of the role of the false belief task has been 
approached.  
13 
 
 
     The `standard version' of the false belief task presents the child with a character, 
Sally, who leaves a desirable object such as a chocolate in her basket, before departing 
the scene. In her absence, another character, Anne, removes the object and places it in a 
box. Children are asked to predict, on Sally's return to the room, where Sally will look 
for the object (or, sometimes, where she thinks the object is). Four-year-olds tend to 
succeed at this task ± correctly attributing a false belief to Sally, saying that she will 
look for the object in the basket ± while younger children tend to fail (see Wellman, 
Cross & Watson, in press, for review).This has led many scholars to conclude that 
children undergo a radical shift in their understanding of the mind. For instance, Gopnik 
(1993, p. 1) claims that at about age 4, there is an important developmental shift to a 
representational model of the mind and Wimmer and Weichbold (1994, p. 45) state that 
not until the age of about 4 years do children become able to attribute belief states to 
themselves and other people (see also Flavell, 1988, p. 247). Under this view, failure at 
false belief task rejects some serious dearth in children's understanding of the mental 
lives of themselves and others ± a dearth in `theory of mind'.  
 
     By pre-school, most children have quite a complicated understanding of mental 
states, and especially emotions. For example older pre-schoolers can identify a range of 
emotions, and generally understand that people: (i) do not always really feel what they 
appear to feel; (ii) show emotional reactions to an event that are influenced by their 
current mood, or even by earlier emotional experiences associated with similar events; 
and (iii) can experience two conflicting emotions more or less at the same time (Flavell 
& Miller, 1998). These developments in emotional understanding make children much 
more skilled ‘mind readers’, and so transform their social interactions. Preschoolers also 
understand some of the most basic facts about thinking: namely, that it is an internal 
human activity that refers to or represents real or imaginary things. They can also 
appreciate that human behaviour is influenced not only by transient mental states (e.g., 
thoughts, beliefs, emotions, precepts) but also by more stable characteristics such as 
ability and personality (Flavell, 1999). It seems likely that that this new and relatively 
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complex ‘folk psychology’ underpins the development of children’s self-concepts, 
which in turn are likely, to influence how children interact and engage with social, 
partners (Eder, 1990). By 4 years of age, most children can attribute mistaken beliefs to 
themselves and to others, and so begin to show new and advanced forms of social 
interaction, including tricks, jokes and deception. Four-year-olds can also appreciate that 
the word ‘know’ expresses more speaker certainty than ‘think’ or ‘guess’ (Flavell & 
Miller, 1998; Montgomery, 1992; Perner, 1991; Taylor, 1996). It seems reasonable to 
suppose that these improvements in understanding knowledge and belief make 4-year-
olds more sophisticated social partners; and indeed false-belief performance is correlated 
with connectedness of conversation (Stokowski & Dunn, 1996), teacher ratings of social 
competence (Lalonde & Chandler, 1995) and elaborate joint pretend play (Hughes & 
Dunn, 1997; Taylor & Carlson, 1997; Youngblade & Dunn, 1995). 
     It is seen that children from larger families typically show accelerated false-belief 
comprehension. Even though this finding initiated an outbreak of research into 
individual differences in theory of mind, its interpretation remains a matter of 
controversy. Interestingly, this effect appears stronger for younger siblings (Ruffman et 
al., 1998); a pattern that runs against the usual advantage shown by first-borns in their 
language skills and general cognitive development (Hoff-Ginsberg, 1998). This finding 
is consistent with Hughes and Cutting’s (1999) demonstration that environmental 
influences on theory of mind were primarily non-shared (i.e., child-specific), and is open 
to two different interpretations. One possibility is that interactions with older siblings 
provide children with the benefits of a skilled partner (e.g., in games of pretend play), 
who can operate within the child’s ‘zone of proximal development’ (Vygotsky, 1978). 
Alternatively, it may be that children benefit from observing older siblings interacting 
with others, and especially caregivers. In particular, witnessing salient emotional 
interactions between other family members may facilitate children’s developing theories 
of mind (Dunn & Brown, 1991; Lagattuta, Wellman & Flavell, 1997). Assessing the 
relative importance of direct participation vs. bystander witnessing of emotion 
exchanges would require diary-based studies, such as those conducted to examine direct 
and indirect effects of marital conflict on children’s socio-emotional adjustment 
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(Cummings, 1994; Cummings, Ballard, El-Sheikh & Lake, 1991; Jaffe, Wolfe, Wilson 
& Zak, 1986; Jenkins & Smith, 1991). 
     A good body of knowledge concerning what children at various stages understand 
about minds has accumulated over the past decade. Natural language data suggests that 
children first come to understand perception and desire then later understand belief 
(Bartch & Wellman, 1995; Bretherton & Beeghly, 1982) and experimental work 
confirms that progression (Gopnik & Slaughter, 1991 ).  However for any given aspect 
of mind there are complex and simple level of understanding. Consider an example of 
perception: by age 3, children understand that seeind leads to knowing, so that someone 
who who has looked in a container is more likely to know about its contents than is 
someone who has not looked (Pillow, 1989). Children under claim that one would know 
that a ball is blue just by feeling it, without any visual access whatsoever(O’ Neill, 
Astington & Flavell, 1993). Understanding emotions also exhibits different levels. 
Young children have rudimentary knowledge about emotions, knowing by 18 months, 
for example , that someone who makes a disgust face at gold fish crackers and smiles at 
brocolli should be given the brocolli not the Goldfish to eat (Repacheli & Gopnik,1997). 
However not until children are older do they understand how to cope with sad feelings, 
or that people can have mixed emotions(harris, 1989; Harter & Whitesell, 1989). 
     Researches have also studied children’s concept of thinking and consciousness, and 
have found that although 4 years- old know that thinking differs talking, occurs inside 
the head and is associated with certain body postures. They are not very good at 
specifying just what a person is thinking about even when it is patently obvious to an 
adult (Flavell, Green & Flavell, 1995). A very active area of research has concerned 
children’s understanding of false belief , or that people might think something that is not 
true. It appears that children gradually acquire this understanding between 3 and 5 years 
of age(Wimmer & Perner, 1983). Some scholars have characterised younger children’s 
view of the mind as relatively static and emphasised that with development, children 
increasingly appreciate that the mind is interpretive (Shwanenflugel, Fabricus & Noyse, 
1996; Wellman, 1990). 
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     Within any culture , there are ofcourse many ways in which any event or behaviour 
can be explained. Consider the event of a woman, jiggling her leg. One might explain it 
with reference to a trait: she is a nervous person , so she jiggles her leg. Or one might 
give a belief- desire explanation: she wants to lise weight, and she thinks jiggling her leg 
will help her to do so. A situation explanation could be that she is about to give a speech, 
and that situation is temporaily making her nervous. There is an “other side of the coin”  
quality to situation explanation, in that they often imply internal person factors. A fourth 
possible cause might be other people: her mother in law makes her nervous. This could 
be seen as a situation cause, wth the situation being a certain person. A fifth type of 
explanation, rarely discussed in the literature is intentinal agents of some special 
ontological status. In many societies people commonly believe that dead ancestors “live” 
among them(i.e., Tallensi; Fortes, 1987) and might even control their actions in some 
cases. 
     In all the explanations so far, intention still at root. But in some cases the intention is 
considered to be in others. However there are some explanations that lack intention 
component altogether . Wellman(1995) and Haris (1995) each arguged that children’s 
understanding of mind is probablly universal in early years, and that cultural variations 
occur only at more advanced levels. Angelline S Lillard (1997) suggested that children 
might be influenced by their culture to entertain a variety of notion. It seems quite 
possible that children are willing to entertain  a wide variety of  explanations and that the 
explanations they continue with are the ones that are reiterated by the cultural surround. 
     Two important sources of information for social judgments are personality 
dispositions (traits) and social norms. Existing research suggests that young children do 
not find traits salient. Two experiments explored how information about preferences 
(what someone likes) and rules (what is allowed or forbidden) affected social judgments. 
Five-year-olds predicted people’s future behavior would be consistent with rules, but 
appeared insensitive to information about preferences. Preferences were better predictors 
than rules for 8-year-olds. Older children and adults consistently judged that actors 
would want to, and be happy to, satisfy preferences rather than rules. Younger children 
were more likely to use rules to infer people’s psychological states. Results are 
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consistent with the hypothesis that deontic relations, such as rules and norms play a 
central role in young children’s social cognition, with ideas of individual psychological 
dispositions emerging in middle childhood (Charles W. Kalish & Sean M. Shiverick, 
2004).  
    Children’s abilities to comprehend narration were surprisingly extensive. Younger 
children can better understand realistic stories than fairly tales and older ones managed 
to understand both kinds of stories. Astington (1993) emphasized the children’s theory 
of mind to their understanding of narrative, especially in comprehending the two 
landscapes of a story: the landscape of action and the landscape of consciousness. Older 
children are more competent in their communication and perceived mode of intentions. 
Moreover when talking about fairy tales, they use different arguments for the motives of 
characters behaviuor (M. Bialecka & Pikul, 1998).  
     Children ask more about biological and social phenomena than about artifacts or 
nonliving natural phenomena, with most questions ambiguous as to whether they were 
requests for causal or teleological explanations. In responding to these ambiguous 
questions, parents generally invoke causal rather than teleological explanations. The 
tendency to favor causal explanation was confirmed by analyses of transcripts from a 
longitudinal study of spontaneous speech in a father–son dyad. These results suggest 
that children’s bias toward teleological explanation does not straightforwardly receive 
from parent explanation ( Kelemen, & Casler, 2005).  
      Astington & Edward, 2010 found that theory of mind develops gradually, with 
intuitive social skills appearing in infancy and then reflective social cognition 
developing during the toddler and preschool years. Three-year-olds know that different 
people may want, like and feel different things. By age 4 or 5, children know that people 
may think different things. They understand that sometimes a person may believe 
something that is not true but, in that case, what the person does or says is based on the 
false belief.  There are differences in the rate of typical development that partly depend 
on factors in the environment, such as family talk and disciplinary strategies, interaction 
with siblings, story books and pretend play, as well as factors in the child, such as 
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language and cognitive control abilities.  There are consequences to theory-of-mind 
development that are seen in children’s social competence and success in school.  
 
1.4.2   NEED OF THE STUDY 
     It is but common for all human beings that we attribute causes to our own and others 
behavior. Children do learn it from the family environment. Whether the explanations 
given by children are influenced by the family environment is the primary focus of the 
present study. 
    So far, the majority of studies involve middle-class, Western children. More research is 
needed with children from different backgrounds and cultures to investigate similarities and 
differences in theory-of-mind development. In the present study, there is an effort to see 
first, how explanations in the family affect the explanations given by the child and 
second, to see the nature, development and distinctions of the behavioural explanations 
among child and adults in the family context. 
 
              1.4.2   OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY 
     To understand how explanation of behavior in the family context affect explanation 
of behavior by the children. 
 
                1.4.3 DELIMITATION OF THE STUDY 
      The present study is delimited within the sample of 30 children and their family 
members’ in Rourkela. 
     The scope or area of data collection is limited only in families of Rourkela. 
     Less statistical techniques like frequency and percentage calculation is adopted due to 
lack of time. 
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                                               CHAPTER- II 
 
2.   METHOD OF THE STUDY 
The main agencies of educational activities are plan and procedure. “Well begun is half 
done” is a well known saying. The entire super structure of every successful work 
depends on planning. Through plan and suitable procedure, we can make our work 
successful. In order to proceed to any research field the investigator has to follow a 
systematic method. Method of study helps the researcher to arrive at certain valid, 
objective, accurate solution of a given problem. 
      In the present study the investigator has adopted the “observation and recording of 
mother child interaction”, “adult- adult interaction”, and “situational probing for both 
the child as well as other adults” in order to find out the different types of explanations 
given among children in the family context. These methods involve clearly defined 
problems and definite objectives. 
2.1   SAMPLE 
     A sample is the true representative of the whole population. Though it is possible to 
meet all the members of population but it is not possible to do so within the time 
boundary. Thus for this problem the investigator has collected 30 numbers of families. 
The name of the inspection region is Gopabandhu Pali, which is a suburban region 
present in Rourkela. The family structure is nuclear. The child taken for the sample 
purpose is in the age group of 3+ to 5+ years. All children were from joint family 
structures. The child is school going (going to Anganwadi or Formal School Setup). The 
mother’s is not below 50 years old, and she is a housewife. The sample is taken through 
randomization that is lottery method. Out of 30 samples of children, 15 numbers of boy 
and 15 numbers of girl children are there. Out of 30 children, each age group consists of 
10 numbers of children that is 10 numbers of 3 + years old children, 10 numbers of 4 
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years old children and 10 numbers of 5+ years old children. The mean of the total 
10year children is 5.15 and their standard deviation is 0.58. 
     Out of 10 numbers of 5+year children, 6 numbers of girls and 4 numbers of boys are 
there. Out of which, the mean age of girl children is 5.08 and their standard deviation is 
0.13 and that of boys mean age is 5.25 and their standard deviation is 0.22. Out of 10 
numbers of children 6 numbers of girl children and 4 numbers of boys are there. The 
mean of the total number of 4 years old children are 4.36 years and their standard 
deviation is 0.29. The mean of the 4 years old girl children are 4.3 and their standard 
deviation is 0.35. The mean age of four 4 years old boys is 4.45 and their standard 
deviation is 0.17 respectively. Whereas the total mean of the all 10 numbers of 3 years 
old children is 3.43 years and their standard deviation is 0.14. The total mean of all 
3years old girl children is 3.5and their standard deviation is 0.17 respectively. And the 
total mean of the 3 years old boys are 3.4 and their standard deviation is 0.13 
respectively. 
                  2.2   TOOLS AND TECHNIQUES 
TOOLS 
     Tools are the instruments through which the investigator collects data for the 
purpose. Though there are different types of tools in researches, in order to collect 
relevant data, but here the investigator has taken the story telling, group discussion, 
playing with children, showing pictures to the children and asking questions, and the 
questionnaire as the important tools for the collection of data.  
     Telling stories has long been recognized as an important part of medicinal, 
knowledge, and personal and spiritual vehicle for connecting us to other people. It is 
a means for understanding ourselves and our place in the world. We use stories to 
construct meaning and communicate ourselves to another. Stories help us organize 
and make sense of the experiences of a life. Considering the importance of 
storytelling to a child's development, psychologists have promoted the positive 
effects of reading and telling children stories for decades. It is a particularly good 
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technique to teach children rational thinking, as stories can explain children how 
people rationally solve their problems. Stories are mostly effective in influencing the 
mode our children think and act, because they like to hear or read them over and 
over again. This repletion, combined with your children's imaginations and the 
immeasurable power of your presence, makes stories one of the best ways to 
influence their thinking (Shapiro, 2000).  
     Learning about people’s ideas, experiences and life histories requires qualitative 
rather than quantitative research. A group discussion encourages participants to 
discuss issues and topics that would reveal their experiences. To learn about 
different kinds of explanations given among the children in a family, it helps a lot 
making family members talk about their ideas, if they have activities to do and 
participate in. When doing group discussion with the family members, the children 
get familiar with the investigator that is very much essential for collecting 
information from the child as well as from the family members (Berry, Fazili, & 
Farhad, 2003).  Similarly playing with children is an important instrument for 
collecting information from the children. By playing with children the investigator 
comes closer to the children and gets familiar with them for which the investigator 
can easily collect information from them. Showing picture and asking questions to 
the children is another important tool for collecting information from the children. 
TECHNIQUES 
     Techniques are the procedure through which the tool is handled in order to collect the 
data. The instruction of questionnaire and the outline for the general information from 
the respondent is known as techniques. 
2.3  PROCEDURE 
     Data collection is the process of gathering and measuring information on variables of 
interest, in an established systematic fashion that enables one to answer stated research 
questions, test hypotheses, and evaluate outcomes.  
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     First of all the investigator has visited to the study area i.e., Gopabandhupali, which 
is present at sector -6, Rourkela. The investigator has chosen this area because of the 
availability of data and communication convenience. At first of the investigator has 
identified a key informer, who gives all necessary information regarding the availability 
of the data. Then she first has gone to each of the families and established a good rapport 
among the family members. Then investigator has started a pilot study, which is the 
replica of entire study to test all aspects of study design, which provided the following 
benefits for collection of data. 
Provided better knowledge 
Feature of sampling frame 
Nature of population and its variability 
Discovering nature of relationships between variables 
Identified field problems 
Detected flaws, weaknesses and ambiguities 
Estimating time required for administering questionnaire, completing questionnaire 
Helped in developing better approaches 
    Gaining access and co-operation of respondents in proper communication, clear 
information, confidentiality, evaluation of feedback on tools like refusals, non response, 
inconsistencies etc, helped to change the order of question, translation of questions etc. 
       After completing the pilot study, the investigator has taken two months for data 
collection that is from December to February. First of all, the investigator has collected 
the demographic data of each thirty families. Then the investor has collected data by 
doing group discussion with the family members in the family context. For example, on 
the topic of BPL Card, or about their livelihood and income. After that the investigator 
has collected data through mother- child interaction, i.e., by doing storytelling, game 
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playing and conversation on returning from school. At last the researcher has collected 
data through asking questions from the questionnaire which contains 16 numbers of 
questions.  However the researcher has faced some problems in asking questions to the 
people while collecting data. For example the problems arising from the respondent 
sides are:-  
Biases and prejudices (prestige bias for income) 
Politeness: not referring to say negative, unpleasant, or critical things 
Ignorance and misunderstanding 
Non response, disinterestedness, and carelessness. 
And some problems aroused due to the ways of asking questions such as 
The length and time required 
Language, style, and wording 
Long questions etc. 
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                                                          CHAPTER- III 
 
3.   RESULT 
3.1   ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 
     After collecting the data, the further step of the investigation is its analysis and 
interpretation. The raw data has no meaning for investigation unless it is analyzed and 
interpreted with appropriate statistical techniques.  However valid, reliable and adequate 
data may not serve the purpose unless and until they are carefully edited, systematically 
classified and tabulated, scientifically analyzed, intelligently interpreted and rationally 
concluded. Analysis and interpretation is the computer where the data is the input and 
findings are output. 
     The different kinds of explanations given in maximum number of times by children 
ranging from 3+ to 5+ are coded as follows. These coding are adapted from the Folk 
Explanation, A Coding Scheme for Folk Explanations of Behaviour, version 4.1, given 
by Malle in 1989. The explanations and their coding are given as follows. 
Types of explanation                                                                          Codes 
Reason explanation                                      311 
Cause explanation                                      11* 
Causal histories of reason, other person’s behavior                        241 
Causal histories of reason, agent + situation                         231 
Reason explanation, beliefs, agent content                                             312 
Cause explanation, situation causes                                                        120  
Factor enabling explanation, agent behaviour                                         611 
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TABLE-1 Frequency of Various Types of Explanations by Five Years Old Children 
 
Source:  Folk Explanation, A Coding Scheme for Folk Explanations of Behavior, version 4.1, by Malle, 1989 
 
C 1 - Frequency of explanations given by child1 
C 2 - Frequency of explanations given by child 2 
C 3 - Frequency of explanations given by child 3  
C 4 - Frequency of explanations given by child 4 
C 5 - Frequency of explanations given by child 5 
C 6 - Frequency of explanations given by child 6 
C 7 - Frequency of explanations given by child 7  
C 8 - Frequency of explanations given by child 8 
C 9 - Frequency of explanations given by child 9 
C 10 -Frequency of explanations given by child10 
 
     The table 1 depicts that much of the explanations given by the 5 year old children are 
mental state marker explanations, which is comprised of 96.6 percent. Mental state 
marker is a reason type explanation. After mental state explanation, causal histories of 
reason, other person’s behaviour and factor enabling explanations are given most of the 
time. Their percentages are 93% and 90% respectively. The explanation which is given 
less number of times is cause explanation situation causes, whose percentage is 76.6%. 
the reason explanation, beliefs, agent content coded as 312 is also given maximum 
numbers of time that is 80%, which is less than that of the reason type mental state 
explanation, and causal histories of reason and factor enabling explanations. 
 
 
 
Types of 
explanation 
(codes)  
C1  C 2  C3  C4  C5  C6  C7  C8  C9  C 10  Total 
sample  
Total no. 
of 
frequency  
Percenta
ge (%)  
311  2  6  3  5  2  2  3  4   2  30  29  96.6  
11*  3  3  2  3  2  3  2  4  2  2  30  26  86.6  
241  4  1   5  2  4  3  2  3  4  30  28  93.3  
312  2  3  2  6   3   4  2  2  30  24  80.0  
120  1  3  1  2  2  5  3  2  3  1  30  23  76.6  
611  2  3   3  4  2  4  3  2  4  30  27  90.0  
231   3  5  2   3  2  4  3  3  30  25  83.3  
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     Figure 1   Percentage of different types of explanations by 5+ year’s children 
This figure 1 shows the different kinds of explanations given by the 5+ years old 
children. It shows that the reason explanation, mental state marker explanation is given 
maximum numbers of times as compared to other explanations, respectively. 
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    TABLE-2   Frequency of Various Types of Explanations by Four Years Children 
      
 The above table 2 depicts that the children and their family members have given the mental 
state marker explanation (311) maximum times. About 83.3 percent explanations constitute the 
mental explanation. After that the causal histories of reason, agent + situation explanations are 
given in maximum orders. That constitutes about 76.6 percent of the total explanations given 
by the 4 years old children. And the minimum times of explanations given are reason 
explanations, agent, belief content which is coded as 312. The percentage of this explanation is 
66.6 percent. The percentage s of cause explanation and cause explanation, situation causes are 
equal. That is these explanations are given equal number of times. The percentages of these 
two explanations are 73.3 % each respectively.  
 
Types of 
explanation 
(codes) 
C1  C2   C3  C4  C5  C6  C7  C8  C9  C10  Total 
sample  
Total no. 
of 
frequency  
Percentage 
(%)  
311  2  4  3  3 2  2  3  4   2  30  25 83.3 
11*  3  3  2  3  2  1  2  2  1  2  30  21 70 
241  4  1   2 2  1  3  2  3  4  30  22  73.3  
312  2  3  2  6   3   1  2  1  30  20 66.6 
120  1  2  1  2  4  1 3  2  2  3  30  21 70.0 
611   6 3  1  2  1  3  2  4  30  22  73.3  
231  2 3  4  2  1 2  2  1 3  3 30  23  76.6  
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            Figure 2 Percentage of different types of explanations by 4+ years children 
The above figure 2 represents the different types of explanations given by the 4+ year 
children. It shows that the four years old children are giving mental state explanations, 
maximum times and the causal histories of reason explanation is given less number of times. 
TABLE- 3 Frequency of Various Types of Explanations by Three Years Children 
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Types of 
explanation 
(codes) 
C1  C 2  C3  C4  C5  C6  C7  C8  C9  C10  Total 
sample  
Total no. of 
frequency  
Percentage 
(%)  
311    2    2 2  1 30  7 23.3 
11*  1     1    1 30   10 
241  1 1     2    30  4 13.3 
312   2   1 1  1  1 30  6 20.00 
120            30    
231            30    
611  2 2     2 2     1  30  7 23.3 
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The above table 3 depicts that most of the three years old children were unable to answer the 
questions. They have given cause explanations, agent causes (11*) in very less quantity. The 
percentage of the cause explanation, agent causes is 10%. Their mental state marker 
explanations and causal histories of reasons are given in equal numbers. All types of 
explanations given by these children are less in numbers as compared to 4+ and 5+ years’ 
children.  And also they have not given the cause explanation, situation causes, and factor 
enabling explanations, agent behaviour which are coded as 120 and 611.  
 
Figure-3   Percentage of different types of explanations by 3+ years children 
    The above figure depicts the various types of explanations given by the three year old 
children. This shows that the reason explanation and the causal histories of reason 
explanation are given in equal numbers of times by the three year old children and the 
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reason explanation, agent causes, and factor enabling explanations are not given by the 
children completely. 
              3.2 MAJOR FINDINGS 
From the analysis of above three tables the following findings can be drawn. 
     Children ranging from 3+ to 5+ years are using different types of explanations in 
their family. The explanations which are given maximum times are Reason 
explanation(311),cause explanation(11*), causal histories of reason, other person’s 
behaviour (241), causal histories of reason, agent + situation (231), reason explanation, 
beliefs, agent content (312), and cause explanation, situation causes ( 120). The five 
years children give reason explanation, mental state marker explanations maximum 
times as compared to the 3+ years and 4+ years children. The mental state marker 
explanations include want, need, fear, hope, think, like, know etc. The 5+ and 4+ 
children include these words maximum times in their explanations. The explanation 
which is given less number by the 5+ years children is cause explanation, situation 
causes, whose percentage is 76.6%. And the minimum times of explanations given by 
the 4+ years children are cause explanation (120), whose percentage is 60 percent.  
     The five years old children can explain behaviour much faster as compared to the 
four years old children, without taking support from their family members. But in case 
of three years old children, they are almost dependent on their family to explain 
behaviour. This is perhaps, due to simple development of ToM between them. These 
above tables indicate that a crucial development of ToM occurs early in the age of 4 
years between the children. Hence the 4+ and 5+ children are giving more mental state 
explanations which show that they have a well developed ToM. These explanations are 
influenced by the family, because the children are influenced by their environment 
where they are brought up.  These types of explanations are taught in the family, for 
which the children might be using these explanations maximum times.  
Other types of physical observations found in the study are, 
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The children between 3 to 4 years 
         Communicates freely with family members and are not familiar to others. 
          Understands the cause feeling 
Needs adult help to negotiate any problem   
Pronunciation has improved, likes to talk about own interests  
Unable to tell a story 
Between 4+ to 5+ years 
Is becoming more independent from family 
Is asking lots of questions 
Takes time making friends 
Can able to tell a story. 
The children having more number of siblings have a well developed ToM. 
     However the graph of the different kinds of explanations given among the children 
ranging from 3+ to 5+ years can be shown as follows. This figure indicates that the 
among 3+ to 5+ years children the five years old children give all kinds of explanations 
maximum time as compared to the 4+ and 3 + year children. The five year olds children 
give the reason explanation, mental state marker maximum numbers of time as 
compared to the three and four years old children. After that the four years old children 
give the maximum number of times as compared to the three years old children. They 
also give mental state marker explanation maximum times, but less compared to the five 
years old children. The three years old children are giving mental state as well as the 
factor enabling explanations, maximum times. These explanations have an equal 
percentage that is 23.3%. they have not given the reason explanation, belief, agent 
behaviour and the cause explanation, situation causes.  
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Figure 4 Comparison between all the explanations given among children of 3+, 4+ 
and 5+ years old.      
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                                         CHAPTER- IV 
4. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
4.1   GENERAL DISCUSSION 
     The general points about the choice among explanation modes are important for 
discussing. First, the folk explanations of behavior rely on key abstract components of theory 
of mind (e.g., the concept of intentionality, the distinction between beliefs and desires) and if 
a person lacks these concepts, then the person’s choice of explanation should be condensed 
to one, a simple automatic explanation mode.  
                        
                       A second point concerns the microstructure of choosing between explanation modes, in 
which attentive representations combine with uninformed processes (e.g., reliance on 
conceptual assumptions and automatic choice of words when constructing the 
explanation).  
 
     The third point is that the conditions of choosing explanation modes depict 
explanations both as a cognitive tool—to answer one’s own wondering—and as a social 
tool—to manage impressions and adjust to an viewer. This duality of functions also exists 
on other levels of analysis. For example, reason explanations have several specific 
features, among them the type of reason cited (referring either to a belief state or a desire 
state) and the linguistic marking of that state with a mental state verb (“I thought,” “she 
wanted”). Knowing the agent’s definite reasons, a social perceiver can more easily know 
and predict the agent’s behavior, therefore using reason explanations as a cognitive 
instrument.  
 
     But agents who explain their own behavior also use the different types of reasons for 
managing the audience’s perception of their rationality and guilt (Malle et al., 2000; 
Nelson & Malle, 2000). Similarly, when people explain others’ behavior, they use mental 
state verbs to emphasize that these are the agent’s (and not some commonly accepted) 
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reasons, thus distancing themselves from that reason (e.g., “Why is she not eating any 
dessert?”—“She thinks she’s been gaining weight”; Malle et al., 2000).  
 
    The basic duality of cognitive and social function not only characterizes modes and 
features of folk explanations but also the folk theory of mind as a whole, which is a 
conceptual equipment that helps resolve cognitive as well as social errands. It should not be 
surprising that this diversity of errands and functions requires far more than a system of 
causal reasoning or trait/situation attribution; it requires an interwoven framework of folk 
concepts that bind behavior to mind and thus make behavior clear expected, and socially 
defensible (Malle, 1982).  
 
     The folk theory of mind, and especially the intentionality concept, plays a vital role in 
behavior explanations. Indeed, explaining behavior has sometimes been characterized as the 
hallmark of folk psychology or theory of mind, even though other processes, such as 
prediction, control, and evaluation are of equal importance. Explanations, however, often 
come in verbal form and are therefore more amenable to investigation, especially if we want 
to learn about both their conceptual underpinnings and their role in social interaction (Malle, 
2005).   
  
      The development of ToM among the children depends on the number of the siblings the 
children have and the interaction with their family members. This finding is steady with 
Hughes and Cutting’s (1999) exhibition that environmental influences on theory of mind 
were primarily non-shared (i.e., child-specific), and is open to two different interpretations. 
One possibility is that interactions with older siblings provide children with the benefits of a 
skilled partner (e.g., in games of pretend play), who can operate within the child’s ‘zone of 
proximal development’ (Vygotsky, 1978). Alternatively, it may be that children take 
advantage from observing older siblings interacting with others, and especially caregivers. 
In particular, witnessing salient emotional interactions between other family members may 
facilitate children’s developing theories of mind (Dunn & Brown, 1991; Lagattuta, Wellman 
& Flavell, 1997).  
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     This is seen that children can understand mind from early stages. However their rate of 
development of ToM differs from human different stages. The 3 years children have a less 
frequency of ToM development as compared to 4- and 5 years old children (Wellman & 
Harry, 1995).  Results show that people give more Reason explanations as the default mode 
of explaining intentional behaviour with a frequency much more than other modes of 
explanations, that is 75% (Malle, 1995). When explainers use reason explanations, they 
refer to the beliefs and desires the agent considered when deciding to act.  
             4.2   CONCLUSION 
     Explanations are the answers to why- questions by ordinary folk. Explanations of 
behaviour play an important role in human’s social cognition. They help people to derive 
meaning from other’s behaviour and to clarify their own behaviours to others. In the case 
of behaviour explanations the pertinent conceptual frame work has been called theory of 
mind (ToM) and also folk, naïve or common sense psychology. This frame work 
conceptualizes behaviour as causally related to mental states and thus makes mental state 
inference a central element of social cognition. Not only adults, but also children can use 
folk explanations in their daily life, which is greatly influenced by their family. This study 
shows that most of the 4+ and 5+ children give mental state explanations. This shows that 
these children have a well developed ToM, for which they are able to give mental state 
explanations which the 3+ years children lack.  
     By knowing about distinct modes of behaviour explanations we can go below 
explanations to understand the social perceiver’s conceptual assumptions that lie beneath 
the expressed explanations. This study shows that children can understand the intentional 
and unintentional behaviour and can attribute according to that. 
4.3   LIMITATION 
This study is limited within a small sample size, present within Rourkela in a small 
suburban region called Gopabandhupali. 
This study is limited within nuclear families. 
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The current study has only examined the 3+ to 5+ years children. 
This study has limited within less statistical techniques.  
 
4.4   FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
    The present study would be a better study if it would have been taken in following 
ways. 
         It will be more improved and perfect if the investigator will take more sample units. 
         The study will be more satisfactory and wide if the investigator will take the study in 
         state and national level. 
         It can be improved by increasing the objectivity in data collection. 
         If more and perfect statistical technique for analysis and interpretation of data will be  
         applied, then it would be better one. 
         If more time will be provided, it can extend the scope of the study. 
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                                               Appendix-A 
 
   
About The Family 
 
/ /  
Urban/Suburban/Rural 
 - 
Father’s name- 
-     
 
Age-  in  years 
 
   - 
Education level- 
/ - 
Occupation- 
 - 
Mother’s name- 
-    
 
Age-         
in years 
 
   - 
Education level- 
/ - 
Occupation- 
 
  -    - 
 Child’s Name -                    Birth-Order Of The Child-                        
-______ ______     - 
   Age-_______Years _____ Months    Date Of Birth-            
  
 
   
 / 
  
 
Nuclear
/ 
Joint 
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   - 
School and level- 
- 
Sibling- 
-______   
 
   Age-_______ in Years 
   - 
Education Level- 
 
    - 
Number Of Members In The Family- 
 
 - 
Monthl
y 
Income- 
   - 
Any Other Observations- 
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                                                     Appendix- B 
Questionnaire 
IV. Self as actor 
Positive 
1. Aapne apni ice-cream uske saath share ki kyunki….. 
       , …… 
2. Aapne apni pencil dekar uski help ki kyunki…… 
       , …… 
3. Aapne uski books uthane mein help ki kyunki…….  
         , …… 
4. Aapne apki toffees uske saath share ki kyunki….    
      , …… 
Other as actor 
Positive 
1. Usne apni ice-cream aap ke saath share ki kyunki…… 
          ,  ……. 
2. Usne apni pencil dekar apki help ki kyunki….. 
           ,  ……. 
3. Usne aap ki books uthane mein help ki kyunki…. 
            ,  ……. 
4. Usne toffees aap ke sath share ki kyunki…….. 
            ,  ……. 
 
 
Self as actor 
Negative 
1. Apne ball se uski peeth par maara kyunki……. 
         ,  …….. 
2. Aapne usko peeche se dhakka di kyunki …… 
              , …. 
     3. Aapne uski new watch apne pass rakh li kyunki….. 
         ,  ……. 
     4. Apne uske new toy apne paas rakh liya kyunki….. 
         ,  ……. 
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Other as actor  
Negative 
         1. Usne ball se aapke ke peeth par maara kyunki…….. 
            ,  ……. 
         2. Usne aapko peeche se dhakka diya kyunki…….. 
         ,  ……. 
         3. Usne aapki new watch apne paas rakh li kyunki…… 
                  ,  ……. 
         4. Usne aapka new toy apne paas rakh liya kyunki…….. 
             ,  ……. 
   V.   1. I am happy, because ……. 
            ,  ……. 
          2. I am angry, because…. 
     ,  ……. 
          3. I am sad, because…. 
            ,  ……. 
        1. Father is happy, because….. 
       ,  ……. 
   2. Father is angry, because…. 
      ,  ……. 
   3. Father is sad, because…… 
             ,  ……. 
   1. Mother is happy, because…. 
      ,  ……. 
   2. Mother is angry, because….. 
     ,  ……. 
   3. Mother is sad, because…. 
      ,  ……. 
 
 
 
